68 lines
4.3 KiB
Text
68 lines
4.3 KiB
Text
If I perform an act, which is considered malicious, but perform it without the
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intention of malice, is that act still malicious?
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I think the answer to this question is no.
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Let's start with what I'm really asking: does the morality of an action rely on
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intent?
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To say that it does not raises (at least) one big concern: if the morality of an
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act does not rely on intent, then it follows that the morality of actions are
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objective; they exist with a morality universally pre-established, regardless of
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individual experience. I cannot accept this proposition. If I were to
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accept it, I would be accepting that offence is the responsibility of the
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offender, and not the offended. This is simply not the case.
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Let's focus on this for a moment: Offence is the responsibility of the offended,
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not the offender. This means if someone calls you a mean name, it is your
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responsibility to determine if that is offensive or not. Part of this is rooted
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in Stoic principles. I can control only my perceptions, and nothing more, so if
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I perceive something as offensive, then that is my choice. On the other hand, I
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cannot control how others perceive my actions, and thus I cannot control if I
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offend others. Do not mistake this as an excuse to be rude or unjust. Recall the
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importance of temperance and justice, and be wise in action.
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To begin, recognize that through our perceptions we can know what offends us,
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and we should extend this understanding to others; do unto others, etcetera.
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Continue, and recognize that if we are offended, then we are allowing offence to
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control our perceptions. This is absurd. Accept, though, that not all will share
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in this understanding. This is not to say, speak only in a way that you do not
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offend. This is unreasonable. This is to say, speak with the knowledge, that
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your intentions may have no bearing on another's perceptions. Another may allow
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offence to control their perceptions, much as they may allow hate or fear or
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greed to do so. I will say again, this is absurd. Never relinquish control over
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the only thing which you can control. Never empower an ephemeral master such
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as emotion, that which will cause catostrophe then flee when atonement is due.
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Let's recurse. It is our responsibility to understand offence, and to
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recognize when it seeks to control us. We cannot control when others are
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offended. We can understand when and why our actions may cause offense, and we
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can use and share this knowledge to better understand ourselves, and our
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environments. Most importantly, though, we must accept that if we have no
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control over offending someone, then intentions are irrelevant. Thus, offense is
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subjective.
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Let's recurse another step. Does the morality of an action rely on intent? We
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must decide if morality is objective, or subjective. If morality is objective,
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then there is an objective "good" which exists universally, free of experience.
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Were this the case, our intentions would be entirely relevant to our actions,
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and, in the case of offense, we could say anything we wanted and cause no
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offense, so long as our intentions are good. However, we've already established
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that this is false, and so it follows that there is no objective morality
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(Sorry, Rand). Morality is subjective. What you consider good, you were taught,
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and learned, and developed. We, as society, have agreed that certain things are
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good, and thus we embrace them as such, and teach them as such, and help them
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develop. Thus it is our responsibility to forge our morality as best we can,
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and then help forge the morality of society.
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Does the morality of an action depend on intent? I propose yes, though
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indirectly. To the acted-upon and society, intent matters little, but to the
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actor, the morality of an action depends entirely on intent. By shaping our
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actions to be as full of our intent as possible, we act in such a way as to make
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the reception of the action as explicit as possible. If we wish to act in a
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morally righteous manner, then we must infuse all our actions with the
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undeniable intention of righteousness. And though it may be received
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differently, we have done all within our power to act morally. Most importantly,
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based on the reception, we now have a point of reference; an introspective aid.
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We can now temper our morality against those of others and society, and through
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this repeated feedback cycle, we can hone our morals.
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