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Refactor ScriptApiSecurity for cleaner separation of concerns

This commit is contained in:
sfan5 2024-11-03 14:24:35 +01:00
parent 4c44942a39
commit 1fd4e0b82d
11 changed files with 229 additions and 135 deletions

View file

@ -260,6 +260,8 @@ void ScriptApiSecurity::initializeSecurity()
lua_pop(L, 1); // Pop empty string
}
#if CHECK_CLIENT_BUILD()
void ScriptApiSecurity::initializeSecurityClient()
{
static const char *whitelist[] = {
@ -375,6 +377,8 @@ void ScriptApiSecurity::initializeSecurityClient()
setLuaEnv(L, thread);
}
#endif
int ScriptApiSecurity::getThread(lua_State *L)
{
#if LUA_VERSION_NUM <= 501
@ -408,19 +412,24 @@ void ScriptApiSecurity::setLuaEnv(lua_State *L, int thread)
bool ScriptApiSecurity::isSecure(lua_State *L)
{
#if CHECK_CLIENT_BUILD()
auto script = ModApiBase::getScriptApiBase(L);
// CSM keeps no globals backup but is always secure
if (script->getType() == ScriptingType::Client)
return true;
#endif
lua_rawgeti(L, LUA_REGISTRYINDEX, CUSTOM_RIDX_GLOBALS_BACKUP);
bool secure = !lua_isnil(L, -1);
lua_pop(L, 1);
return secure;
auto *script = ModApiBase::getScriptApiBase(L);
if (auto *sec = dynamic_cast<ScriptApiSecurity*>(script))
return sec->m_secure;
return false;
}
bool ScriptApiSecurity::safeLoadString(lua_State *L, const std::string &code, const char *chunk_name)
void ScriptApiSecurity::getGlobalsBackup(lua_State *L)
{
if (!ScriptApiSecurity::isSecure(L)) {
lua_getglobal(L, "_G");
return;
}
lua_rawgeti(L, LUA_REGISTRYINDEX, CUSTOM_RIDX_GLOBALS_BACKUP);
// We cannot fulfill the callers wish securely if they don't exist.
FATAL_ERROR_IF(lua_isnil(L, -1), "Globals backup requested, but it is not available. Cannot proceed securely.");
}
bool ScriptApiSecurity::safeLoadString(lua_State *L, std::string_view code, const char *chunk_name)
{
if (code.size() > 0 && code[0] == LUA_SIGNATURE[0]) {
lua_pushliteral(L, "Bytecode prohibited when mod security is enabled.");
@ -441,7 +450,7 @@ bool ScriptApiSecurity::safeLoadFile(lua_State *L, const char *path, const char
fp = stdin;
chunk_name = const_cast<char *>("=stdin");
} else {
fp = fopen(path, "rb");
fp = std::fopen(path, "rb");
if (!fp) {
lua_pushfstring(L, "%s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
return false;
@ -500,7 +509,35 @@ bool ScriptApiSecurity::safeLoadFile(lua_State *L, const char *path, const char
}
bool checkModNameWhitelisted(const std::string &mod_name, const std::string &setting)
std::string ScriptApiSecurity::getCurrentModName(lua_State *L)
{
auto *script = ModApiBase::getScriptApiBase(L);
auto *sec = dynamic_cast<ScriptApiSecurity*>(script);
if (sec && !sec->modNamesAreTrusted())
return "";
// We have to make sure that this function is being called directly by
// a mod, otherwise a malicious mod could override a function and
// steal its return value. (e.g. request_insecure_environment)
lua_Debug info;
// Make sure there's only one item below this function on the stack...
if (lua_getstack(L, 2, &info))
return "";
FATAL_ERROR_IF(!lua_getstack(L, 1, &info), "lua_getstack() failed");
FATAL_ERROR_IF(!lua_getinfo(L, "S", &info), "lua_getinfo() failed");
// ...and that that item is the main file scope.
if (strcmp(info.what, "main") != 0)
return "";
// at this point we can trust this value:
return getCurrentModNameInsecure(L);
}
static bool checkModNameWhitelisted(const std::string &mod_name, const std::string &setting)
{
assert(str_starts_with(setting, "secure."));
@ -517,7 +554,7 @@ bool checkModNameWhitelisted(const std::string &mod_name, const std::string &set
bool ScriptApiSecurity::checkWhitelisted(lua_State *L, const std::string &setting)
{
std::string mod_name = ScriptApiBase::getCurrentModName(L);
std::string mod_name = getCurrentModName(L);
return checkModNameWhitelisted(mod_name, setting);
}
@ -528,16 +565,8 @@ bool ScriptApiSecurity::checkPath(lua_State *L, const char *path,
if (write_allowed)
*write_allowed = false;
std::string str; // Transient
std::string abs_path = fs::AbsolutePath(path);
if (!abs_path.empty()) {
// Don't allow accessing the settings file
str = fs::AbsolutePath(g_settings_path);
if (str == abs_path) return false;
}
// If we couldn't find the absolute path (path doesn't exist) then
// try removing the last components until it works (to allow
// non-existent files/folders for mkdir).
@ -560,61 +589,84 @@ bool ScriptApiSecurity::checkPath(lua_State *L, const char *path,
}
if (abs_path.empty())
return false;
// Add the removed parts back so that you can't, eg, create a
// Add the removed parts back so that you can e.g. create a
// directory in worldmods if worldmods doesn't exist.
if (!removed.empty())
abs_path += DIR_DELIM + removed;
// Get gamedef from registry
ScriptApiBase *script = ModApiBase::getScriptApiBase(L);
const IGameDef *gamedef = script->getGameDef();
tracestream << "ScriptApiSecurity: path \"" << path << "\" resolved to \""
<< abs_path << "\"" << std::endl;
// Ask the environment-specific implementation
auto *sec = ModApiBase::getScriptApi<ScriptApiSecurity>(L);
return sec->checkPathInternal(abs_path, write_required, write_allowed);
}
bool ScriptApiSecurity::checkPathWithGamedef(lua_State *L,
const std::string &abs_path, bool write_required, bool *write_allowed)
{
const auto &set_write_allowed = [&] (bool v) {
if (write_allowed)
*write_allowed = v;
};
std::string str; // Transient
auto *gamedef = ModApiBase::getGameDef(L);
if (!gamedef)
return false;
if (!abs_path.empty()) {
// Don't allow accessing the settings file
str = fs::AbsolutePath(g_settings_path);
if (str == abs_path)
return false;
}
// Get mod name
std::string mod_name = ScriptApiBase::getCurrentModNameInsecure(L);
if (!mod_name.empty()) {
// Builtin can access anything
if (mod_name == BUILTIN_MOD_NAME) {
if (write_allowed) *write_allowed = true;
set_write_allowed(true);
return true;
}
}
// Allow paths in mod path
// Don't bother if write access isn't important, since it will be handled later
if (write_required || write_allowed != NULL) {
const ModSpec *mod = gamedef->getModSpec(mod_name);
if (mod) {
str = fs::AbsolutePath(mod->path);
if (!str.empty() && fs::PathStartsWith(abs_path, str)) {
// `mod_name` cannot be trusted here, so we catch the scenarios where this becomes a problem:
bool is_trusted = checkModNameWhitelisted(mod_name, "secure.trusted_mods") ||
checkModNameWhitelisted(mod_name, "secure.http_mods");
std::string filename = lowercase(fs::GetFilenameFromPath(abs_path.c_str()));
// By writing to any of these a malicious mod could turn itself into
// an existing trusted mod by renaming or becoming a modpack.
bool is_dangerous_file = filename == "mod.conf" ||
filename == "modpack.conf" ||
filename == "modpack.txt";
if (write_required) {
if (is_trusted) {
throw LuaError(
"Unable to write to a trusted or http mod's directory. "
"For data storage consider minetest.get_mod_data_path() or minetest.get_worldpath() instead.");
} else if (is_dangerous_file) {
throw LuaError(
"Unable to write to special file for security reasons");
} else {
const char *message =
"Writing to mod directories is deprecated, as any changes "
"will be overwritten when updating content. "
"For data storage consider minetest.get_mod_data_path() or minetest.get_worldpath() instead.";
log_deprecated(L, message, 1);
}
// Allow paths in mod path
// Don't bother if write access isn't important, since it will be handled later
if (write_required || write_allowed) {
const ModSpec *mod = gamedef->getModSpec(mod_name);
if (mod) {
str = fs::AbsolutePath(mod->path);
if (!str.empty() && fs::PathStartsWith(abs_path, str)) {
// `mod_name` cannot be trusted here, so we catch the scenarios where this becomes a problem:
bool is_trusted = checkModNameWhitelisted(mod_name, "secure.trusted_mods") ||
checkModNameWhitelisted(mod_name, "secure.http_mods");
std::string filename = lowercase(fs::GetFilenameFromPath(abs_path.c_str()));
// By writing to any of these a malicious mod could turn itself into
// an existing trusted mod by renaming or becoming a modpack.
bool is_dangerous_file = filename == "mod.conf" ||
filename == "modpack.conf" ||
filename == "modpack.txt";
if (write_required) {
if (is_trusted) {
throw LuaError(
"Unable to write to a trusted or http mod's directory. "
"For data storage consider minetest.get_mod_data_path() or minetest.get_worldpath() instead.");
} else if (is_dangerous_file) {
throw LuaError(
"Unable to write to special file for security reasons");
} else {
const char *message =
"Writing to mod directories is deprecated, as any changes "
"will be overwritten when updating content. "
"For data storage consider minetest.get_mod_data_path() or minetest.get_worldpath() instead.";
log_deprecated(L, message, 1);
}
if (write_allowed) *write_allowed = !is_trusted && !is_dangerous_file;
return true;
}
set_write_allowed(!is_trusted && !is_dangerous_file);
return true;
}
}
}
@ -624,9 +676,8 @@ bool ScriptApiSecurity::checkPath(lua_State *L, const char *path,
const SubgameSpec *game_spec = gamedef->getGameSpec();
if (game_spec && !game_spec->path.empty()) {
str = fs::AbsolutePath(game_spec->path);
if (!str.empty() && fs::PathStartsWith(abs_path, str)) {
if (!str.empty() && fs::PathStartsWith(abs_path, str))
return true;
}
}
}
@ -635,16 +686,15 @@ bool ScriptApiSecurity::checkPath(lua_State *L, const char *path,
const std::vector<ModSpec> &mods = gamedef->getMods();
for (const ModSpec &mod : mods) {
str = fs::AbsolutePath(mod.path);
if (!str.empty() && fs::PathStartsWith(abs_path, str)) {
if (!str.empty() && fs::PathStartsWith(abs_path, str))
return true;
}
}
}
// Allow read/write access to all mod common dirs
str = fs::AbsolutePath(gamedef->getModDataPath());
if (!str.empty() && fs::PathStartsWith(abs_path, str)) {
if (write_allowed) *write_allowed = true;
set_write_allowed(true);
return true;
}
@ -662,12 +712,11 @@ bool ScriptApiSecurity::checkPath(lua_State *L, const char *path,
}
// Allow all other paths in world path
if (fs::PathStartsWith(abs_path, str)) {
if (write_allowed) *write_allowed = true;
set_write_allowed(true);
return true;
}
}
// Default to disallowing
return false;
}